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 ARTICLE  
 The gender of representation: On 
democracy, equality, and parity * 
 Blanca Rodríguez  Ruiz ** and  Ruth  Rubio-Marín *** 
 The debate regarding the statutory introduction of gender parity in electoral lists has 
been led, on the one hand, by those who envisage parity as a way to attain substantive 
equality between the genders. The opposition has been led by those who, on the other 
hand, reject it as going against the very principle of equality in its formal dimension, 
as well as against the autonomy of political parties. Based on the experience of France 
and Italy on this matter, this article discusses both sets of arguments and applies them 
to the Spanish context. It further defends the need to bypass the theoretical parameters 
of equality and afﬁ rmative action in order to place the defense of electoral parity within 
the theoretical parameters of the postliberal democratic state. It aims, therefore, at 
articulating electoral parity as a conceptual requisite of the democratic state. 
 Introduction 
 Among the various feminist struggles for gender equality in the West, achieving 
parity in political representation is, today, a primary goal in many countries. It 
is the objective that best exempliﬁ es the empowerment of women proposed at 
the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women’s Rights (Beijing, 
1995) as a crosscutting goal of all initiatives aimed at achieving real equality of 
the genders. A prominent demand, it is also — as we shall see — a polemical one, 
in both the political and the legal arenas and among courts and scholars. 
 Politically, there is not always agreement on whether it is strategically wise 
to introduce measures intended to guarantee, or simply to foster, women’s 
having a matching — or even a minimum — presence alongside men in repre-
sentative bodies. Legally, it is not always clear whether such measures are 
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consistent with the constitutional framework of the legal system for which 
they are intended. Indeed, measures that aim to balance the presence of 
women and men in representative political bodies raise doubts as to their 
consistency with the principles underlying political representation within the 
state. The dominant model of representation is based on the notions of gener-
ality, unity, and equality — a model of representation that, in the words of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court,  “ presumes that the will of the representatives is 
the will of the constituency, by virtue of which the actions of representatives 
are attributed to voters as a whole, not just to those who voted for them or who 
form the majority. ” 1 This supposition requires that the vote of those repre-
sented, in effect, be free and equal. Consequently, as a precondition for the 
enactment of general laws, that is, equal laws, general representation requires 
the free and equal voting rights of those represented. Politics has thus been 
deemed the realm of formal equality, a terrain in which there is no room for 
afﬁ rmative action. Here, it is argued, afﬁ rmative action would go against the 
modern notion of political representation as unitary and general. It would 
undermine, moreover, the right of excluded male candidates to stand for 
elections. The autonomy of political parties, it is further claimed, would also be 
jeopardized. 
 On the other hand, defenders of electoral quotas favoring women candi-
dates in order to achieve a greater or a balanced presence of women in polit-
ical representation 2 highlight the superficiality of formal equality — what 
Luigi Ferrajioli has called the  “ aporia into which an acritical notion of the 
principle of equality can fall. ” 3 A formal conception of equality, it is claimed, 
is inadequate when it comes to attaining true gender equality — as is shown 
in the political sphere by the gap between the number of men and women 
representatives. It is important, advocates of quotas argue, to remember 
that humanity is divided  grosso modo fifty-fifty between women and men. 
It is, therefore, reasonable that each gender should have equal representa-
tion. There is no reason, however, why this should call into question the 
 1  Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional [S.T.C.] Judgement 10/1983, Feb. 25, 1983. 
 2  This article will focus mainly on the debate regarding parity; however, strictly speaking, a distinc-
tion should be made between measures aimed at achieving parity — understood as an even, bal-
anced, or comparable presence (for example, approximately proportionate to the gender 
distribution in the population) — and quota measures that seek to guarantee a minimum presence 
of women in representative bodies (for example, a minimum of 25 or 30 percent). Although some 
of the arguments in favor of a quota system can be extended to the case for parity, the underlying 
logic is not necessarily the same. 
 3  Luigi Ferrajioli,  Differenza di genere e garanzie di uguaglianza [ Gender Difference and Equality Guaran-
tees ],  in  GENERE E DEMOCRAZIA: LA CITTADINANZA DELLE DONNE A CINQUANT’ANNI DAL VOTO [GENDER AND DEMOC-
RACY: WOMEN’S CITIZENSHIP FIFTY YEARS AFTER SUFFRAGE] 93 ( Franca Bimbi & Alisa Del Re eds., Rosenberg & 
Sellier 1997) (authors ’ translation). 
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principles of generality and unity in modern political representation. Indeed, 
equal representation does not imply that women should only vote for 
women, or men only for men, or that each gender should only represent its 
own interests. Each elected representative continues to represent the popu-
lation as a whole. Democracy and equality require, nonetheless, that each 
gender have a minimum level of representation and, in fact, that they be 
comparably represented. 
 Thus run the basic lines of the constitutional argument concerning mini-
mum quotas — or parity — for the genders in political representation. We 
present them and discuss them in depth, looking at the French, Italian, and 
Spanish experiences in the ﬁ rst part of this article. The objective of this article, 
however, goes beyond the analytical description of these case studies and the 
discussion of arguments put forward in their contexts. In the second part of 
this article we will defend the constitutionality of measures aimed at achieving 
gender parity in representation, arguing that these are not merely afﬁ rmative 
action measures and that the debate concerning their validity should be 
grounded at a point well outside the discussion as to whether a formal or 
substantive equality model should prevail in politics and, ultimately, outside 
the debate on rights—speciﬁ cally, women’s right to a larger share of political 
representation based on a substantive concept of equality; or men’s right not 
to be excluded from electoral ballots, which would infringe their right to 
stand for elections and violate the formal concept of equality in political 
representation. 
 Rather, we claim, the parity debate should be understood as a debate 
about democracy — namely, a debate about the model of democracy implicit 
in the pursuit of gender equality in political representation. In this regard, 
we argue that a model of democracy based on gender parity completes the 
transition from the liberal state to the democratic state, a transition that 
began when universal suffrage was established. We argue that, in order for 
this transition to be fully achieved, the presence of men and women in par-
liament must be comparable and, if this does not occur spontaneously, it 
can and must be enforced. Depending on the situation, parity may be 
imposed by the political parties themselves or, if necessary, by law. Our 
main contention, then, is that a true democracy must be a parity democ-
racy, and it is legitimate, therefore, to promote that condition, even to 
impose it by law — not only from the standpoint of a concern with substan-
tive equality as a woman’s right but as a structural prerequisite of the demo-
cratic state. 
 1.  Balanced representation as a constitutional matter: 
The French, Italian, and Spanish experiences 
 In Europe, the debate over parity in political representation — that is, parity 
democracy — has been fueled by the legislative experiences of some European 
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countries. These include some in which quotas have been legislated without 
the need for constitutional reform; 4 others in which such reform opened the 
path to quotas; 5 and still others in which constitutional jurisprudence has 
invalidated legislative initiatives to introduce minimum quotas or parity in 
representation, forcing a constitutional amendment before such measures 
could be introduced. This happened in France and Italy. In Spain, a law intro-
ducing parity democracy is pending constitutional challenge. 
 1.1.  The French experience 
 In France, the ﬁ rst initiatives aimed at allaying the chronic deﬁ cit of women in 
political representation were debated in the 1970s, prompting the Socialist Party 
to adopt the ﬁ rst voluntary quotas. 6 It was not until 1982, however, that the leap 
was made to establish legally mandated quotas with a project to reform the munic-
ipal electoral system. The parliament passed a measure that barred electoral bal-
lots from having more than 75 percent of its candidates of the same gender. 7 
 4  In Belgium, a 1994 law established that there should be at least 25 percent female candidates on 
all electoral lists, with the provision that this percentage would increase with each election, up 
to 33 percent in 1999, with the ultimate goal ﬁ xed at 40 percent between 2010 and 2015. The 
law provided for incremental application, so that it would be applied in 1994 to local elections; in 
January 1996 to federal, and in January 1999 to the remaining elections. The rule was applied 
during the ﬁ rst elections, but the outcome was far from what had been hoped, mainly because 
it said nothing about the positions that men and women should be assigned on the list, and, there-
fore, many women were placed at the bottom. Thus, in 2000 and 2002, there were legislative 
reforms aimed at attaining parity at the different levels of representative positions.  See Law 
No. 1994-05-24/37, May 24, 1994, Moniteur belge [Belgian Monitor], July 1, 1994. 
 5  In Portugal, the issue was posed from the outset as a matter for constitutional amendment. Thanks 
to that amendment, enacted in 1997, article 109 of the Portuguese Constitution now establishes that 
 “ direct, active participation of men and women in political life is a condition and fundamental instru-
ment for the consolidation of the democratic system, and the law must promote equality in the exercise 
of civil and political rights and non-discrimination based on gender for access to public positions. ” 
 6  Regarding the French case and the debate around it, see, among many others,  OLIVIA BUI-XUAN ,  LE 
DROIT PUBLIC FRANÇAIS ENTRE UNIVERSALISME ET DIFFÉRENTIALISME [ FRENCH PUBLIC LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND DIF-
FERENTIALISM ] (Université Paris II 2003);  LA PARITÉ  DANS LA VIE POLITIQUE: RAPPORT DE L’OBSERVATOIRE DE LA PARITÉ 
 ENTRE LES HOMMES ET LES FEMMES [PARITY IN POLITICAL LIFE: REPORT OF THE RESEARCH STUDY ON PARITY BETWEEN MEN 
AND WOMEN] (Gisèle Halimi ed., La documentation française 1999);  FRANCINE DEMICHEL, À PARTS ÉGALES: 
CONTRIBUTION AUX DÉBATS SUR LA PARITÉ  [IN EQUAL PARTS: CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATES ON PARITY ] (Recueil Dalloz 
Sirey 1996);  SYLVANNE AGACINSKI, POLITIQUE DES SEXES [SEXUAL POLITICS] (Seuil 1998);  JANINE MOSSUZ-LAVAU, 
FEMMES/HOMMES: POUR LA PARITÉ [WOMEN/MEN:  IN FAVOR OF PARITY] ( Presses de Sciences Po 1998);  EVELYNE 
PISIER, ÉGALITÉ OU PARITÉ? LA PLACE DES FEMMES: LES ENJEUX DE L’IDENTITÉ ET DE L ’ ÉGALITÉ AU REGARD DES SCIENCES SO-
CIALES [EQUALITY OR PARITY?  THE PLACE OF WOMEN: IDENTITY AND EQUALITY AT STAKE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCE CONTEXT] 
(La Découverte 1995). 
 7  Loi modiﬁ ant le code électoral et le code des communes et relatif à l’élection des conseillers mu-
nicipaux et aux conditions d’inscription des Français établis hors de France sur les listes électorales 
[Act Amending the Electoral Code and the Code of Municipalities Concerning the Election of 
Municipal Councillors and the Conditions for Inclusion in Electoral Registers of French National 
Residing outside France], Law No. 82-974 of Nov. 19, 1982, Journal Ofﬁ ciel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Ofﬁ cial Gazette of France], Nov. 20, 1982. 
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 Despite the broad political consensus backing the law, sixty delegates from 
the opposition challenged it before the Conseil Constitutionnel. The Conseil 
declared the law unconstitutional based on article 3 of the French Constitution 8 
and on article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 
1789, 9 which is incorporated in the current Constitution, arguing that both 
sanction the principle of equality in the eyes of the law and forbid the division 
of the electorate or candidates into categories. 10 Faithful to the universalist 
notion of citizenship prevalent in France, the Conseil Constitutionnel held that 
the principles of national sovereignty and the indivisibility of the electoral body 
precludes any person or group from claiming the exclusive exercise of national 
sovereignty. Furthermore, it argued, article 6 of the 1789 Declaration states 
that it is citizenship itself that confers the equal right to vote and to stand for 
elections, without any qualiﬁ cations or exceptions, other than those that may 
stem from such conditions as age or incapacity. 
 The quota measure having thus failed without much ado among feminists 
(who were never comfortable with the idea of a 25 percent quota, given that 
women constitute more than 50 percent of the population), it was some years 
before the march toward parity recovered its momentum. The idea of parity, 
put forward initially by the Council of Europe and taken up by the intellectual 
elite and the feminist movement as an instrument of political pressure, became 
popular in 1992 after the publication of the book,  Au pouvoir citoyennes —
 Liberté, égalité, parité , 11 which advocated strict parity between men and women 
in the assignment of seats on legislative assemblies at all territorial levels. One 
 8  Article 3 reads: 
National sovereignty resides in the people, who exercise it through their representatives and by 
means of referendum. 
No one sector of the people or single individual shall claim its exercise. 
Suffrage may be direct or indirect in the conditions set forth by the Constitution, and shall 
 always be universal, equal and conﬁ dential. 
According to the law, electors are all French nationals of both sexes, who are of age and enjoy 
full exercise of their civil and political rights. 
 9  Article 6 reads: 
The law is the expression of general will. All citizens have the right to contribute to its making, 
either personally or through their representatives. As all citizens are equal before the law, they 
are likewise all equally eligible for any public ofﬁ ce, position or employment, according to their 
abilities and with no distinction other than their virtues and talents. 
 10  CC decision no. 82-146DC, Nov. 18, 1982, J.O. p. 3475. 
 11  FRANÇOISE GASPAR, CLAUDE SERVAN-SCHREIBER & ANNE LE GALL, AU POUVOIR, CITOYENNES: LIBERTÉ, ÉGALITÉ, 
PARITÉ [POWER FOR WOMEN CITIZENS: FREEDOM, EQUALITY, PARITY] (Le Seuil 1992). The book argues that 
for elections following the proportional system, 50 percent of candidates should be of each gender. 
For elections organized according to the majority system, it proposes reducing existing districts to 
half the number by means of a merging system, and turning them into binomial districts for elec-
toral purposes, so that each candidacy could include a man and a woman. 
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year later, the Organization of Women for Parity would be formed as a civil 
society advocacy group for bringing together all organizations in support of 
the cause; at about the same time, the Manifesto of the 577 for Parity Democracy 
(alluding to the number of seats in the National Assembly and signed by 289 
women and 288 men), calling for parity legislation, would appear in  Le 
Monde . 12 Finally, in the 1995 presidential campaign, it was clear that the idea 
had moved from legislative and judicial forums to the political arena: all three 
leading presidential candidates included in their platforms the promise to adopt 
measures to put an end to the chronic underrepresentation of women in politi-
cal bodies. As the culmination of the movement, in 1996 ten former female 
ministers published their  “ manifesto of ten in favor of parity ” in  L’Express . 13 As 
we will see, the basic idea was to reﬂ ect the duality of humanity precisely in 
those forums in which decisions are made that affect humanity as a whole. If 
the law had played a central role in the age-old exclusion of women from the 
sphere of democracy, it was claimed, it would now be incumbent upon the law 
to make amends, as it were, and thus guarantee women ’ s inclusion in a genu-
ine democracy. 
 Despite massive popular support for the parity cause and its promise to mod-
ernize French democracy by feminizing the political elite of the country, the 
idea of enacting it as an alternative to the quota system, which had been con-
stitutionally invalidated years before, did not ﬂ ourish. In 1999, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel once again invalidated a law, in this case, the law regulating 
elections to the Corsican Assembly, which would have put in place a system of 
strict parity (an equal number of male and female candidates) on electoral bal-
lots. 14 The Conseil based its decision explicitly on the precedent of 1982, 
emphasizing that no distinction on the basis of gender in any form was com-
patible with the principle of equality and, above all, with the indivisibility of the 
electoral body. 
 Thus, in the end, it took a constitutional amendment to open the way to par-
ity. In 1999, Constitutional Law No. 99-569 of July 8 amended article 3 of the 
French Constitution with the introduction of a new paragraph — the fourth —
 whereby  “ the law shall favor equality among women and men to have access 
to electoral mandates and hold elective ofﬁ ce. ” The purpose of the reform was 
also to amend article 4 of the Constitution so as to provide that political parties 
 “ shall contribute to the application of the principle set forth in the last section 
 12  Réseau Femmes pour la Parité [Organization of Women for Parity],  Manifeste des 577 [ Manifesto 
of the 577 ],  LE MONDE , Nov. 10, 1993,  also available at  http://multitudes.samizdat.net/spip.
php?article736 (in French). 
 13  Manifeste pour la Parité [Manifesto for Parity],  L’EXPRESS , June 6, 1996. 
 14  CC decision no. 98-407DC, Jan. 20, 1999, J.O. p. 1028.  See Eric Millard,  Constituting Women: 
The French Ways,  in  THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 122 (Beverley Baines & Ruth 
Rubio-Marín eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
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of Article 3 [the principle of equal access of men and women to hold elective 
ofﬁ ce and functions] in accordance with the provisions of the law. ” 15 
 The hurdle of unconstitutionality thus overcome, parity made its debut in 
the form of the June 6, 2000, Law on Equal Access of Women and Men to 
Elective Ofﬁ ces and Functions. 16 It required, under penalty of disqualiﬁ cation, 
that all parties in elections employing lists include 50 percent of candidates of 
each gender (±1) on their ballots. This included elections to municipal ofﬁ ce 
(in towns of fewer than 3,500 inhabitants), regional ofﬁ ce, the Corsican 
Assembly, the Senate (in those cases where the system of proportional repre-
sentation applied), and the European Parliament. 17 For legislative elections 
based on the system of single-member districts, the law stipulated a penalty in 
public ﬁ nancing proportionate to the degree of noncompliance for any party 
that failed to include an equal number of candidates of each gender (allowing 
for a 2 percent margin of error). 
 Once again, the opposition in Parliament challenged the law in the Conseil 
Constitutionnel. They argued that the constitutional amendment only invited 
the Parliament to adopt measures to promote the guarantee of equal access of 
both men and women. Binding measures, such as those provided for in the 
law, they claimed, were still invalid to the extent that they unconstitutionally 
limited the freedom of voters, infringed the principle of indivisibility of the elec-
torate, and jeopardized the right of those men to stand for elections who would 
have to renounce their electoral aspirations in favor of female candidates. This 
time, however, the Conseil Constitutionnel rejected the appellants ’ claims. The 
constitutional amendment, it stated, introduced nuances into the principle of 
indivisibility of the electorate inasmuch as it allowed for legislators to adopt 
measures, whether binding or not, to afford men and women equal access to 
representative positions. 18 
 15  The text of article 4 would become: 
Political parties and groups shall contribute to the exercise of suffrage. 
They shall be freely constituted and exercise their activity in respect for the principles of  national 
sovereignty and democracy. 
 They shall contribute to the application of the principle stated in the last section of Article 3, 
according to the law. 
 16  Law No. 2000-493 of June 6, 2000, J.O. p. 131. The system established by this law has recently 
been perfected in the amendment involving Law No. 2007-128 of Jan. 31, 2007, J.O., p. 1941, 
 “ tendant à promouvoir l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et 
fonctions électives ” (to promote equality between women and men regarding access to electoral 
positions and functions). 
 17  In single-round elections, such as European or regional elections, the law requires male and 
 female candidates to be listed alternatively from the top down. In other elections, which are double 
round, parity has to be respected on each list of six candidates, regardless of the order in which 
candidates ﬁ gure. 
 18  CC decision no. 2000-429DC, May 30, 2000, J.O. p. 8564. 
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 1.2.  The Italian experience 
 In Italy, Law No. 81/1993, which regulates local and provincial elections, pro-
vided that in elections for the Consiglio Comunale (Town Hall) the political 
parties had to include a certain minimum number of women on their electoral 
ballots. 19 It stipulated that neither gender could have a presence of less than 25 
percent on lists in municipalities of up to 15,000 inhabitants, and not less than 
33 percent in those of more than 15,000. Similarly, Law No. 277/1993 regu-
lating elections to Congress provided that the political parties must present 
electoral ballots in alternating gender order ( “ zipper list ” ) for elections to seats 
subject to the proportional system (that is, for 25 percent of seats). 20 
 The question of the constitutionality of these measures was brought before 
the Constitutional Court. 21 It originated, paradoxically, in charges placed by a 
male citizen from the town of Molise where, in elections for mayor and town 
hall, the three electoral ballots included only one woman among a total of 36 
candidates in clear violation of Law No. 81/1993. Upon resolution of the case, 
the Consiglio di Stato took it to the Constitutional Court on grounds of uncon-
stitutionality. Speciﬁ cally, the consiglio challenged the compliance of article 
5.2 of Law No. 81/1993, related to the composition of electoral ballots in towns 
of fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, as was the case of the town in question, with 
articles 3 and 51 of the Italian Constitution. Article 51 holds: 
 All citizens of both sexes shall be entitled to hold public and elective ofﬁ ce 
in conditions of equality according to the requirements established by 
law. 
Article 3 provides, in the ﬁ rst paragraph: 
 All citizens shall have the same social dignity and shall be equal before 
the law, regardless of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion or 
personal or social condition. 
And in the second: 
 It is the obligation of the Republic to suppress any economic or social 
obstacles that hinder, and therefore limit the freedom and equality of citi-
zens, the full development of individuals and the meaningful participa-
tion of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of 
the country. 
 19  Regarding the Italian debate on gender quotas and parity, see  GENERE E DEMOCRACIA,  supra note 3;  LA 
PARITÀ DEI SESSI NELLA RAPPRESENTANZA POLITICA: IN OCCASIONE DELLA VISITA DELLA CORTE COSTITUZIONALE ALLA FACOLTÀ 
DI GIURISPRUDENZA DI FERRARA [ PARITY IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL COURT TO FERRERA LAW SCHOOL] ( Roberto Bin et al. eds., G. Giappichelli 2003);  DONNE, POLITICA E PROCES-
SI DECISIONALI [WOMEN, POLITICS AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES] (Licia Califano ed., G. Giappichelli 2004). 
 20  For a complete, concise version of the Italian case, see  GIUDITTA BRUNELLI, DONNE E POLITICA [WOMEN 
AND POLITICS] ( Il Mulino 2006). 
 21  Corte cost., decision no. 422/1995. 
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 Article 51, it was argued, imposes formal electoral equality without excep-
tion. It thus refers to article 3, paragraph 1, in the context of elections and sets 
itself apart from the second paragraph. This reading is consistent with the 
notion of political freedom enshrined in article 49, which grants all citizens the 
right to associate freely by means of parties and thus take part in the demo-
cratic process of deciding the course of national politics. 
 The Constitutional Court declared the challenged article of Law 81 uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, it declared unconstitutional any legal regulation of elec-
toral quotas, including provisions in: Law No. 81 regarding municipal elections 
in towns of more than 15,000 inhabitants; Law No. 277 as it pertains to 
congressional elections; and laws concerning elections in certain regions with 
special autonomy (Friuli-Venezia, Trentino – Alto Adige, and Valle d’Aosta) as 
well as the law on regional elections in regions with ordinary autonomy. The 
Court, in effect, adopted the arguments of the Consiglio di Stato, asserting that, 
in electoral matters, gender is irrelevant and cannot be made to condition the 
exercise of the right to stand for elections, a right recognized for all citizens on 
equal terms. Under article 51, the Court held, such equality may not be quali-
ﬁ ed in the sense indicated under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Constitution. 
This is all the more the case to the extent that electoral quotas are intended not 
to eliminate obstructions to real equality between the genders but, rather, to 
impose directly a measure of equality. The Court thus deemed electoral quotas 
inconsistent with the notion of unitary political representation characteristic 
of the modern state. Yet the Court encouraged political parties to adopt volun-
tary measures to promote women on their electoral ballots. 
 In light of the passiveness of political parties on this issue, the Italian Constitution 
was amended in order to override the Constitutional Court’s objections to the legal 
promotion of a greater presence of women in representative bodies. Constitutional 
Law No. 2/2001 provided that, in order to achieve balanced representation of 
both genders, electoral laws in regions with a special autonomy statute are to pro-
mote parity in elections. Furthermore, Constitutional Law No. 3/2001 added the 
following seventh paragraph to article 117 of the Constitution: 
 Regional laws shall suppress any hindrance of full equality between men 
and women in social, cultural and economic life and shall promote parity 
of access to elective ofﬁ ce between men and women. 
 Constitutional Law No. 1/2003 completed the task by adding a second sen-
tence to the ﬁ rst paragraph of article 51: 
 To such ends, the Republic shall use special measures to promote equal 
opportunities among men and women. 
 These amendments changed the constitutional context in which measures 
promoting women on electoral ballots had to be viewed. Moreover, they  managed 
to bring about a change in the attitude of the Constitutional Court even before 
Constitutional Law No. 1 went into effect. Indeed, the Court rejected a challenge 
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presented by the government against Valle d’Aosta Law No. 21/2003, which 
required that ballots for Regional Council elections include candidates of both 
genders. 22 Not only had the constitutional framework changed, or was about to 
change, in relation to the 1995 ruling; the Court’s rhetoric had also changed. 
The law in question, asserted the Court, does not impose unequal treatment of 
the genders. Rather, its regulations are neutral with respect to gender. The Court 
also ruled that the right of men to stand for elections when excluded from ballots 
cannot be considered infringed, as the conﬁ guration of electoral ballots resides 
exclusively with political parties. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court found 
that the unitary nature of representation was not affected, inasmuch as the law 
under scrutiny established no relevant legal relationship between voters of either 
gender and elected candidates of that same gender. The law in question, rea-
soned the Court, only affects the freedom of political parties when it comes to 
drafting their ballots, although it stipulates that it does so in accordance with the 
new wording of the constitutional text. 
 1.3.  The Spanish experience: Toward a constitutional reform? 
 In Spain, of late, the question has arisen of whether measures pursuing parity 
democracy are in accordance with the Constitution. Recently, four Spanish 
autonomous communities 23 have introduced a system of electoral parity. 24 
Most pertinent, however, has been the passage in 2007 of Organic Law on Real 
Equality of Women and Men by the Spanish Parliament. 25 This law confronts 
the prevailing discrimination against women in Spain and relates it both to the 
limited number of women in positions of political, social, cultural, and eco-
nomic power and to the difﬁ culties they face in reconciling professional and 
family lives. 
 In order to achieve real equality in political participation, the organic law 
on Real Equality of Women and Men 26 articulates what it calls the principle of 
 22  Decision No. 49/2003. 
 23  Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous communities, each with its own legislative and ex-
ecutive power, which relate to the central state as federated states do to a federation, as established 
in Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution and in the communities respective Statutes of Autonomy 
(Estatutos de Autonomía). 
 24  See Law 6/2002, June 21, 2002, which amends Electoral Law 6/1986, Nov. 26, 1986, Autono-
mous Community of the Balearic Islands; Electoral Law 11/2002, June 27, 2002, which amends 
Law 5/1986, Dec. 23, 1986, Castilla-La Mancha; Electoral Law 5/2005, Apr. 8, 2005, which 
amends Law 1/1986, Jan. 2, 1986, Andalusia; and Law 4/2005, Feb. 18, 2005, on Equality of 
Women and Men, Basque Country. There are constitutional challenges pending with respect to 
the Basque and the Andalusian laws. 
 25  In Spain, organic laws are a special category that can only be adopted, amended, or repealed by 
an absolute majority of the House of Representatives. The Spanish Constitution requires that some 
matters, including some fundamental rights, such as political rights, be regulated by Organic Law. 
 26  Organic Law 3/2007, March 22, 2007. 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/6/2/287/737053
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
Rodríguez Ruiz and Rubio-Marín | The gender of representation 297
a balanced presence and amends Organic Law 5/1985 on the General Electoral 
System, requiring that all electoral ballots be composed of candidates with 40 
percent from each gender, a minimum percentage that must be met with every 
set of ﬁ ve positions. The system must be applied in all elections, including 
municipal elections, except in towns with a population of 5,000 or fewer (and 
fewer than 3,000 as of 2011). This also includes regional elections, that is, 
elections for the autonomous communities ’ Legislative Assemblies, although 
the electoral laws regulating these elections can call for an even greater number 
of women. In brief, the principle of balanced presence embodies what we could 
call parity with a margin of ﬂ exibility, as it relies on minimum and maximum 
percentages for each gender, as does the quota system, but endorses percent-
ages that approach 50 percent. There is a constitutional challenge pending 
with respect to these provisions. 
 Will a constitutional reform in Spain be necessary, then, as it has been in 
France and Italy, for the introduction of parity democracy by law to be con-
sidered valid? It is our contention that no such reform is required. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, this article advances the claim that parity democracy is 
fundamental to a proper interpretation of the democratic state and that its 
implementation by law is, consequently, a requirement of democracy 
rightly understood. Before developing our central argument, however, we 
would like to return to the scholarly and legal lines of reasoning on the pro-
motion or legal enforcement of parity democracy developed both in Spain 
and abroad (mainly in the cases of France and Italy outlined above) with a 
view to identifying the arguments that may be relevant to the Spanish 
case. 
 To begin with: Which model of equality should prevail with respect to polit-
ical representation? Are afﬁ rmative action measures appropriate or is a formal 
concept of equality called for? We take our lead from article 9.2 of the Spanish 
Constitution. This article deals with measures that pursue substantive equal-
ity among persons conceived as members of speciﬁ c social groups, that is to 
say, it is concerned with afﬁ rmative action measures that favor socially disad-
vantaged groups beyond the provisions of formal equality granted under arti-
cle 14 of the Spanish Constitution. 27 Article 9.2 has no equivalent in the 
French Constitution. It is, however, comparable to article 3.2 of the Italian 
Constitution, with one important difference. The Italian provision refers to the 
obligation of public authorities to remove  economic and social obstacles that 
hinder the full political participation of individuals, whereas article 9.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution does not specify the nature of the obstacles that must be 
removed. Article 9.2 thus applies to all types of obstacles that hinder women’s 
access to elective ofﬁ ces — whether faced in the system, in political parties, or 
individually. 
 27  See S.T.C. 28/1992, Mar. 9, 1992;  see also S.T.C. 128/1987, July 16, 1987; and S.T.C. 109/
1993, Mar. 25, 1993. 
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 In the Spanish Constitution, the principle of equality has two complemen-
tary dimensions, one formal and the other substantive. These two dimensions 
are mutually beneﬁ cial, conferring meaning and relevance on each other and 
extending to politics. There is, however, the question still raised in certain cir-
cles regarding which model for promoting substantive equality may be applied 
in the area of politics. The issue, here, is the extent to which it is possible to pro-
mote by law a greater presence of women in representative bodies and to do so, not 
by measures aimed at leveling the playing ﬁ eld — ensuring equal opportunities —
 but, rather, by measures that explicitly equalize the presence of both genders in 
representative bodies. Only the former, it is argued in some sectors, can be con-
sidered afﬁ rmative action measures. 28 This would include indirect measures 
such as ﬁ nancial aid from public authorities to political parties, provided in pro-
portion to the percentage of women on their ballots. On the other hand, meas-
ures that set minimum gender quotas on party ballots do not fall within 
afﬁ rmative action because, rather than intervening at the outset to enable 
women to have the same access to representative ofﬁ ce as men do, these meas-
ures directly impose an outcome. This is the case, speciﬁ cally, when voters are 
not given the option of choosing among candidates on election ballots (open 
ballots) but, instead, are presented with closed ballots where party lists are 
voted as blocks. Creating equal opportunities for both genders to have the same 
access to representative positions in politics via mandatory quotas on closed 
electoral ballots — so goes the argument — is tantamount to directly imposing a 
ﬁ xed presence of both genders in election results. Equal opportunity is thus 
transformed into equal results. 
 This line of reasoning was, as we have seen, one of the arguments put for-
ward by the Italian Constitutional Court in declaring unconstitutional the law 
that, prior to the constitutional amendment, had set minimum gender quotas 
on certain electoral ballots. 29 We maintain, however, that reserving such quo-
tas on ballots does not, in fact, guarantee a balanced presence in representative 
ofﬁ ces. If there is a leveling of opportunity and outcome, this occurs in the con-
text of closed ballots and is due not to quotas but, rather, to the closed nature of 
the ballots. It is the latter that transforms opportunity into reality; closed bal-
lots limit the electorate’s control over the transition from opportunity to result 
in the same way that they limit the electorate’s ability to shape their vote in 
any other way. It is not reasonable to attribute to electoral quotas any effects 
that are not directly derived from them. This is not to diminish the worthiness 
of afﬁ rmative action measures in pursuing parity as the ultimate outcome, for 
the fact remains that  “ if the discussion of substantive equality is to be taken 
 28  See, e.g. , Louis Favoreu,  Principio de Igualdad y Representación Política de las Mujeres, Paridad y 
Constitución [ The Principle of Equality and Women’s Political Representation ], 17(50)  Revista Españo-
la de Derecho Constitucional 13, 23–24 (May – Aug. 1997). (advancing this line of reasoning, in 
the French context, as an argument against the parity system). 
 29  Corte cost., decision no. 422/1995. 
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seriously, it is impossible to fully rule out that some variants of equality … may 
be based on measures in some way geared toward  … the outcome. ” 30 
 In light of the foregoing, we should consider the issue of whether manda-
tory electoral quotas constitute a violation of the right of candidates to stand 
for elections who are not included on party ballots because of these quotas, 
thus violating article 23 of the Spanish Constitution. If this is the case, such 
quotas could not even be imposed by the parties on their own. In fact, this was 
precisely the issue that arose in the United Kingdom when, in the parliamen-
tary primaries of 1993 and 1996, the Labour Party presented ballots com-
posed exclusively of women for certain of its electoral colleges. In traditionally 
Labour-leaning colleges, this assured that the seat would be ﬁ lled by a woman. 
One candidate, Peter Jepson, whose candidacy the party had rejected for this 
reason, ﬁ led suit against the party. The Industrial Court of Leeds ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff on the grounds that the policy of presenting ballots composed 
exclusively of women violated the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. 31 To make 
this type of ballot possible, it would require the passage of the Sex Discrimination 
Election Candidates Act of 2002, 32 which allows for the adoption of temporary 
afﬁ rmative action measures until 2015. 
 In a legal context closer to the Spanish one, we saw that the Italian 
Constitutional Court discarded the notion that mandatory electoral quotas 
affect candidates ’ rights to stand for elections when excluded based on such 
quotas. It ruled that aspiring candidates cannot have a  “ hypothetical right of 
inclusion on the ballot, ” this issue lying within the jurisdiction of freedom of 
political parties.  “ There is no  ‘ contest ’ -based method for the selection of candi-
dates that would allow someone who is not included on a ballot to pose a legal 
challenge asserting unfair priority given to someone included on the ballot. ” 33 
This assessment, as we have seen, was shared by the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel; it, too, rejected the assertion that the parity law infringed arti-
cle 3 of the French Constitution by unduly restricting the right to stand for 
elections. 34 Such reasoning is perfectly applicable to the Spanish constitutional 
framework. 35 
 30  Antonio D’Aloia,  Le  ‘ quote ’ electtorali in favore delle donne [ Electoral  ‘ Quotas ’ in Favor of Women ], 
 in  LA PARITÀ DEI SESSI NELLA RAPPRESENTANZA POLITICA,  supra note 19, at 51, 60 (authors ’ translation). 
 31  Jepson & Dyas-Elliot v. Labour Party, [1996] I.R.L.R. 116 (IT). 
 32  This law regulates elections for Parliament, European elections, elections of the Scottish Parlia-
ment, elections for the National Assembly for Wales, and some local elections. 
 33  Corte cost., case no. 49/2003 (authors ’ translation). 
 34  CC decision no. 82-146DC. 
 35  See Alfonso Ruiz Miguel,  Paridad electoral y cuotas femeninas [ Electoral Parity and Female Quotas ], 
1  AEQUALITAS 44, 51 (1999); and Octavio Salazar Benítez,  Las cuotas femeninas en cuanto exigencia de 
la igualdad en el acceso a los cargos públicos representativos [ Female Quotas as a Demand for the Right to 
Equal Access to Representative Positions ], 48 – 49  REVISTA DE DERECHO POLÍTICO 421 (2000). 
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 The above arguments raise the question of whether enforcing minimum 
electoral quotas for both genders contradicts article 6 of the Spanish 
Constitution, which ensures the free and democratic functioning of political 
parties. 36 Indeed — and notwithstanding the U.K. case — reservations on the 
issue of mandatory quotas do not carry over to actual political parties when it 
comes to the voluntary adoption of minimum quotas for women on their lists. 
In Scandinavian countries, for example, the equal presence of men and women 
on election ballots is today an undisputed reality. In Germany as well, all politi-
cal parties foster the presence of women on ballots through quotas, from the 
Green Party’s zipper lists to the one-third quota imposed by the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), the 50 percent quota of the Democratic Socialist 
Party (DSP), or 40 percent in the case of the Socialist Party (SP). Likewise, in 
Spain, both the Izquierda Unida (United Left) and the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (Socialist Party) share a tradition of including mandatory minimum 
measures for both genders in their party statutes. Speciﬁ cally, at the thirty-ﬁ rst 
Socialist Party convention of 1988, the party imposed a minimum quota of 25 
percent for each gender at all levels and then raised it to 40 percent in 1997; 
neither of these measures has given rise to constitutional legitimacy concerns. 
 In addition, the Italian Constitutional Court made it clear that measures 
deemed  “ unconstitutional when imposed by law can nevertheless be looked 
upon favorably when freely adopted by political parties, associations or groups 
participating in elections, subject to the applicable provisions of their respec-
tive statutes or regulations on presenting candidacies. ” 37 The issue at hand, 
therefore, is the constitutionality of minimum gender quotas when these are 
imposed by law on party ballots because of the constitutional provision ensur-
ing the free and democratic functioning of political parties. 38 
 2.  Party autonomy, quotas, and democratic 
representation 
 This brings us to the true Gordian knot of the debate about minimum quotas, 
about the legality of their imposition by law, and, ultimately, about the proper 
place of parity democracy within the democratic state. Indeed, if one looks 
closely, the doubts raised by the constitutional mandate regarding the free and 
 36  This is how it is interpreted, for example, by Paloma Biglino Campos, who believes mandatory 
quotas would damage the party’s right to self-organization.  See Paloma Biglino Campos,  Las mu-
jeres en los partidos políticos: representación, igualdad y cuotas internas [ Women in Political Parties, 
Representation, Equality and Party Quotas ],  in  MUJER Y CONSTITUCIÓN EN ESPAÑA [WOMEN AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN SPAIN] 416 – 417 (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2000). 
 37  Corte cost., case no. 422/1995. 
 38  See this examined in the Spanish context in Fernando Rey Martínez,  Cuotas electorales reservadas 
a mujeres y Constitución [ Electoral Quotas for Women and the Constitution ], 1 A EQUALITAS 52, 56 
(1999). 
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democratic functioning of political parties can itself lead to an  aporia . Any 
assertion that political parties should function  “ freely and democratically ” 
requires a deﬁ nition of the free functioning of political parties within the con-
text of a democratic state. At heart is a question about the very concept of 
democracy. What do we understand it to mean in the context of the modern 
state? What do we understand by  “ democratic state, ” and how can public 
authorities be faithful to this vision? 
 These questions lead us, in turn, to wonder which model can and should be 
in force in the democratic state. Indeed, the application of the principle of  formal 
equality in the political/electoral sphere is related to the free and equal nature 
of voting in the democratic state, which is inherent to representation under-
stood as universal and unitary — a model of representation characteristic of the 
state since its beginnings. The deeper question, then, is whether imposing mini-
mum gender quotas on electoral ballots does indeed depart from this model of 
representation. Or, put another way: To what extent is imposing such quotas 
consistent with democracy and with the concept of representation inherent 
therein? 
 This is the type of debate that has characterized the discussion concerning 
quotas and parity in France. As we have seen, the Conseil’s rejection of the 
constitutionality of the quota law in 1982 was based precisely on the notion 
that such a system departed from equality and universality of voting and from 
traditional French principles of national sovereignty and the indivisibility of 
the electoral body according to French tradition. 39 In the French case, the 
idea of parity came about and gained strength speciﬁ cally relative to the 
quota system as a formula for making the tradition of French universalism 
compatible with the political inclusion of women, as one half of humanity. 
Equality was sought in preference over the quota and, with it, the equal partici-
pation of all in the representation of all. Parity, argue its advocates, is not a 
means for representing women collectively as a group with speciﬁ c interests to 
be exclusively propounded; nor, as held by its detractors, does it turn its back 
on French universalism by opting for a communitarian approach to represen-
tation. It is more about ﬁ nishing the work begun by the French Revolution and 
 39  Similar arguments have been put forward by sectors opposed to electoral parity. In the words of 
one of the strongest opponents of France’s parity law, Robert Badinter (former minister of justice 
and former president of the Conseil Constitutionnel),  “ We are all citizens and nothing more than 
citizens. Thus is the foundational principle of our Republic. Our Republic has never been a mosaic 
of communities or a juxtaposition of diverse components. It has never recognized anything but 
individuals, human beings, and citizens with no discrimination of any kind ” (based on authors ’ 
translation of the quotation taken from  PHILIPPE BATAILLE & FRANÇOISE  GASPARD, COMMENT LES FEMMES 
CHANGENT LA POLITIQUE ET POURQUOI LES HOMES RÉSISTENT [HOW WOMEN ARE CHANGING POLITICS AND WHY MEN 
ARE RESISTING] 8 (La Découverte 1999). In fact, as we have seen, this was also a central line of argu-
ment for those who unsuccessfully challenged the law, hoping that, even after the text of the Con-
stitution was reformed, the Conseil would realize that prescriptive measures like those contained 
in the challenged law were contrary to the principle of indivisibility of the electoral body. 
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preventing an abstract universalism (which, until now, has always de facto 
been a masculine universalism) from denying — as it did for a century and a 
half — women’s right to vote and to stand for elections. It is about preventing 
the continued relegation of women — as is currently the case — to the statistical 
status of (always merely) being politically represented rather than being 
regarded as representatives. 
 In addition, parity’s advocates argue that, unlike the quota system, gender 
parity does not necessarily open Pandora’s box for the French nation to break 
into a multiplicity of groups deﬁ ned by race, religion, age, or sexual orientation, 
each one claiming separate representation. Gender, the argument maintains, 
is not merely another factor of differentiation; it is, by nature, cross-cutting in 
that it is immutable, noncontingent, or, as claimed, the  prima divisio (the uni-
versal difference) because it is the only difference that cannot be disassociated 
from the notion of personhood. 40 Women are not a group or a minority — they 
are half of the population. The citizen is not an abstract, universal entity but, by 
nature, a gendered being. Parity is thus nothing more than the political expres-
sion of the fact that humanity is composed of two gendered halves and, 
therefore, its representative bodies must be analogously composed to be demo-
cratically legitimate. 
 Thus, the distinction between parity and quotas and the discussion as to 
which is compatible with the French universalist tradition is at the forefront of 
the French debate. As stated, this article sets out to defend the constitutionality 
of legislation that makes parity democracy mandatory. Nonetheless, in follow-
ing along with the French debate but taking it further, let us emphasize that 
enforcing minimum electoral quotas for women does not cast doubt on the 
universal and unitary nature of political representation of the state. Indeed, 
defenders of such quotas do not usually claim that women should vote only for 
women or receive votes only from women or that they only represent women’s 
interests. It is emphasized, ﬁ rst and foremost, that, with or without quotas, 
elected representatives, male and female, should represent all citizens, male 
and female. Introducing women into state representative bodies, then, is a way 
of enriching and extending the legitimacy of the democratic system without 
challenging the model of universal and unitary political representation on 
which the state rests. 41 
 40  See  DEMICHEL ,  supra note 6, at 97; and  AGACINSKI ,  supra note 6, at 159. For Spain, see Eva Martínez 
Sampere,  La legitimidad de la democracia paritaria [ The Legitimacy of Parity Democracy ], 107  REVISTA 
DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS 133 (2000). 
 41  See Fernando Aguiar,  A favor de las cuotas femeninas [ In Favor of Female Quotas ], 116  CLAVES DE LA 
R AZÓN PRÁCTICA 30 (2001); Ruiz Miguel,  supra note 35, at 239; and Licia Califano,  Riforme con-
stituzionali e  ‘ quote ’ per le donne [ Constitutional Reforms and Quotas for Women ],  in  LA PARITÀ DEI SESSI 
NELLA REPPRESENTANZA POLITICA ,  supra note 19, at 172; and Licia Calfano,  Azioni positive e rappresen-
tanza politica dopo le riforme costituzionali [ Positive Action and Political Representation after Constitu-
tional Reforms ],  in  DONNE, POLITICA E PROCESSI DECISIONALI,  supra note  19, at  48. 
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 Accordingly, the key issue is not that all women necessarily share, by vir-
tue of being women, a single group of interests or that gender plays a greater 
role than ideological or other differences in determining the political posi-
tions of individuals (women, after all, also operate on partisan logic). What is 
essential is that, due to both women’s biology and, above all, their social 
experience, there are good reasons to think that some interests are gendered. 
That is, there are interests that may not affect or interest all women equally, 
but do affect and interest women as a group more than they do men. 42 We 
could cite as examples, here, interests related to speciﬁ c issues, such as those 
associated with reproductive biology, raising children, and caring for depend-
ents and relatives in need, as well as those related to marginalization, dis-
crimination, and oppression (such as unequal pay and domestic or sexual 
violence). 43 
 To the extent it is possible to identify a list of substantive questions likely to 
motivate the vote of the female electorate or to motivate both men and women 
who are concerned about justice for both genders, it could be argued that the 
debate should focus on ideas and party platform (within the traditional system 
of representation as a means of choice among representatives) rather than on 
the presence of groups (based on a model of representation that aspires to 
 42  This responds to those who have questioned, from the standpoint of political theory, the extent to 
which electoral quotas can be justiﬁ ed based only on the argument that they allow the interests of 
women to be included in the context of political representation. Indeed, as elected women do not 
necessarily represent women, and given the fact that women voters do not elect those who repre-
sent them according to their gender but, rather, based on a system of political parties and in elec-
tions organized according to geographical districts, it has been questioned whether elected women 
can take on the role of representing the  “ interests of women. ” This is particularly the case when 
there is no consensus on what such interests may be, since women are not a homogeneous catego-
ry. Regarding the possibilities and limits of gender quotas related to including interests, see, for ex-
ample,  ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE: THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF GENDER, ETHNICITY AND RACE 
57 – 85 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995); Cynthia Cockburn,  Strategies for Gender Democracy: Strengthening 
the Representation of Trade Union Women in the European Social Dialogue , 3  EUR. J. WOM. STUD. 1 (1996); 
and Anna G. Jonasdottir,  On the Concept of Interest: Women’s Interests and the Limitations of Interest 
Theory, in  THE POLITICAL INTEREST OF GENDER ( Kathleen Jones & Anna G. Jonasdottir eds., Sage 1988). 
 43  See  PHILLIPS ,  supra note 42, at 68 – 69;  FIONA MACKAY, LOVE AND POLITICS: WOMEN POLITICIANS AND THE 
ETHICS OF CARE 83 (Continuum 2001); Jonasdottir,  supra note 42, at 42; and  HEGE SKJEIE, THE 
FEMINIZATION OF POWER; NORWAY’S POLITICAL EXPERIMENT ( Institute for Social Research, Oslo 1988). 
 See, e.g.,  MUJERES EN POLÍTICA [WOMEN IN POLITICS]  (Edurne Uriarte & Arantxa Elizondo eds., Ariel 
1997). On tackling the concept of  “ women’s interests, ” Cockburn and Jonasdottir propose an 
interesting distinction between the formal dimension (summarized in terms of agency) and the 
substantive dimension (regarding the content of the interest). In order for an interest to be 
attributed to women as a whole, it is not necessary, in terms of content, for all women to defend 
the same position regarding a given matter (abortion is a paradigmatic example). Rather, what is 
crucial is that, because the decision on the matter may have a disparate impact on women, it may 
reasonably be argued that women have a special interest in ensuring that this decision not be 
taken without the opinion and participation of women.  See Cockburn,  supra note 42; and Jonas-
dottir,  supra note 42. 
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guarantee the reproduction of social diversity in the representative body). 44 
Nevertheless, we contend that, without a minimum presence of women in rep-
resentative bodies, it is unlikely — despite continued talk of representation and 
advancement of the common good as the good of all those represented — that 
sufﬁ cient attention will be accorded to issues that affect women disparately. 
This is due as much to epistemological limitations as to the limits of human 
empathy and altruism. From this perspective, the rationale for a minimum 
presence of women would not be to replace the underlying logic of the system 
of representation. Rather, the goal would be to improve the conditions of delib-
eration within the mechanics of that system, thus assuring a baseline connec-
tion between representatives and their constituencies and guaranteeing the 
centrality in the political agenda of issues that affect one half of the population 
more than they do the other. By the same token, a minimum presence of 
women would serve, symbolically, to rescue women from their historic invisi-
bility and ensure a space for women of distinct and differing ideologies to iden-
tify and deliberate on fundamental items on that agenda without renouncing 
their internal differences. 45 
 There are, therefore, justiﬁ cations for the statutory imposition of a mini-
mum presence of women in representative bodies. However, our intention is to 
withdraw from the debate on electoral quotas and, instead, to defend gender 
parity in representation as a separate option with its own internal reasoning, 
arguing that the logic of parity transcends that of the quota system. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the logic of minimum quotas, the logic of parity 
cannot be translated into a rationale for minimum representation for other 
socially marginalized groups. Both debates are clearly connected, in that both 
are related to the current crisis of representation — a crisis that encompasses 
both representation and representativeness. We must not forget that, in the 
democratic context, representation is an indirect form of self-government. 
Indeed,  “ to be governed by the decisions (legislative and, through them, execu-
tive) made by our own representatives is a form, albeit indirect, of governing 
 44  Anne Phillips contrasts two different representation models — the politics of ideas and the politics 
of presence. The former, the standard model in representative democracies, places emphasis on 
systems of shared beliefs and on the ideas and values formed, discussed, and expressed through 
political parties. This model is based on the possibility of one social group representing the interests 
of the other, because what is essential is ideological afﬁ nity rather than shared experience. The 
latter arises from growing frustration in the face of the persistent self-referentiality of the political 
class; its thesis is that ideas cannot be entirely dissociated from experience and identity, and there 
is thus a need for representative political bodies to reﬂ ect more accurately the plurality of the soci-
ety they represent.  See generally  PHILLIPS ,  supra note 42. 
 45  See also  JONI LOVENDUSKI & PIPPA NORRIS, GENDER AND PARTY POLITICS (Sage 1993). For this very rea-
son, we believe that from the standpoint of including interests, the minimum-presence quota sys-
tem, which ultimately attempts to guarantee a critical mass, is much more justiﬁ able than the 
parity system, which would rather seem to indicate the impossibility of one gender representing 
the interests of the other, advocating thus a system of mirror representation. 
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ourselves worthy to be considered an authentic historical milestone. ” 46 And, to 
paraphrase Hegel, as an indirect form of self-government, representation only 
makes sense as long as the representative shares in the interest of his/her con-
stituency, that is, if that interest is, in fact, his or her own. 47 The crisis of repre-
sentativeness, then, refers to the ever more elusive nature of representatives as 
actors in the indirect self-governance of the people; to the self-referential nature 
of politics; and to its lack of connection to social and cultural reality. Indirect 
self-governance of the people through their representatives is increasingly 
becoming a legal ﬁ ction. 
 The basic issue is to be found in how far the model of modern representation 
adopted by the liberal state — the model based on unitary and universal politi-
cal representation — continues to be functional, following the consolidation of 
the democratic state and, with it, the opening of the system of political repre-
sentation to a truly heterogeneous society. The transition from a liberal to a 
democratic state implies transcending the ﬁ ctional  “ will of the nation ” and 
replacing the concept of national sovereignty with that of popular sovereignty. 
It also implies that recognizing the equal legal rights of individuals means not 
negating their differences but, instead, guaranteeing  “ the equal right of all to 
assert and protect their own identity. ” 48 The predominant question is whether 
the concept of representation held by the liberal state must now be adjusted in 
order to be compatible with the democratic state. In fact, the failure to make 
such adjustments may well account for the current rift between representative 
bodies and the social reality that should be represented therein. 49 
 This article does not aim to undertake the enormous task of developing a 
model of representation adapted speciﬁ cally to the democratic state. Let us 
merely assert that political representation in the democratic state should be 
conceived of in terms that allow for the expression not only of what unites us 
as citizens in general, 50 along liberal lines of logic, but also of what separates us 
 46  ANGEL GARRORENA MORALES, REPRESENTACIÓN POLÍTICA Y CONSTITUCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA [POLITICAL REPRESENTA-
TION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] 50 (Cuadernos Cívitas 1991). 
 47  GEORG WILHELM FREIDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 282 ( New ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1995) (1822). 
 48  Ferrajioli,  supra note 3, at 95. 
 49  In the words of Angel Garrorena Morales: 
When the bourgeoisie  … originally formulated representation, it encompassed certain signs or 
data (we could say, certain trends or inertia), which have remained ﬁ xed fast to the concept ever 
since, and later on  … have not helped the subsequent unfolding of this category to take place in 
the best way  … they have not helped representation to really be ﬁ lled with representation. 
See  GARRORENA MORALES ,  supra note 46, at 41. 
 50  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,  The Social Contract ,  in  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DIS-
COURSES 149 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1762). 
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as individuals. 51 The scope of this article is different but no less fundamental. 
We defend the idea that parity democracy is inherent to the democratic state 
and that, without it, the state would continue to function within the typically 
liberal notion of presumed equality, which fails to embrace the extension of 
sovereignty and the transition to true equality entailed in the democratic state. 
In other words, parity democracy has its own logic. 
 3.  Parity democracy and the democratic state 
 The parity democracy we propose is grounded on a preconstitutional issue that 
affects the legitimacy of the democratic system — an issue of democratic legiti-
macy that came about with the transition from liberal democracy to the demo-
cratic state, and that determines whether this transition can be considered 
complete. Our argument poses parity democracy as a problem of democratic legit-
imacy that is different from, and arises prior to, the democratic state’s taking on a 
social dimension. It is an argument that transcends the matter of the constitu-
tionality of afﬁ rmative action measures in favor of marginalized social groups, as 
well as the legitimacy of measures to ensure the presence of these groups in repre-
sentative state bodies through a quota system. The need for parity democracy 
came about earlier, hand in hand with the inauguration of the democratic state. 
 The universal suffrage that was envisaged in the transition to the demo-
cratic state was intended to embrace the entire population of men and women 
within the concept of  “ state. ” Nevertheless, even though women became eligi-
ble to vote and to be elected to public ofﬁ ce, the democratic state has remained 
a masculine state because it did not question the prevailing social contract as a 
foundational myth of the state nor raise doubts about the pact between the 
sexes on which the social contract is based. 52 Rather, that transition conﬁ rmed 
and perpetuated the contractual myth of the origin of the state and the ideo-
logical concepts upon which it rests, including liberty and equality as attributes 
ascribed to men — an assumption that rendered women inherently unequal, 
sealing their dependent status. 
 Enlightenment theorists ’ conceptualization of men as independent beings was 
accompanied by a parallel conceptualization of women as dependent on and sub-
jugated to men. A particularly eloquent testament to this can be found in the 
writings of the classic theoretician of democracy Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in which 
the enlightened author lays out the symbolic gender models on which the state 
 51  Indeed, the generality, universality, and impartiality of laws actually depend not on the neutral-
ity of the legislator but on the breadth with which the legislative debate can voice the biases in 
play. The more biases that are brought up and pitted against each other in the debate, the more 
impartial the legislative outcome will be. On this idea, see  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG 
[BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] 212 (Suhrkamp 1994); Klaus Günther,  Legal Adjudication and Democra-
cy: Some Remarks on Dworkin and Habermas , 3  EUR. J. PHIL. 49 (1995). 
 52  CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (Stanford Univ. Press 1988). 
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has continued to thrive — models that, it has been argued,  “ constitute a core, not 
a peripheral theme in his political works. ” 53 Rousseau observes how men are nat-
urally free, whereas women, on the other hand,  “ are made to please (men) and to 
be subjugated ” by them. 54 He bases this essential natural difference between the 
genders on their different physical strengths. Nature has made one sex stronger, 
one weaker. And since for Rousseau, the natural consequently leads to the moral, 
 “ one  must be active and strong, the other passive and weak. ” 55 
 What is interesting is that the perception that physical strength is exclusive 
to men leads Rousseau to assert that only men are free or, rather, that only 
men have the inclination to be so. Liberty, observes Rousseau, contradicts 
women’s nature, which is to submit to and obey men. This prompts his assump-
tion that justice and reason are also the exclusive territory of men. 56 By the 
same token, he ﬁ nds, only men are capable of reason, of searching for abstract 
truths, principles, and axioms. Women, on the other hand, lack theoretical 
intelligence; what they do have, as compensation, is the capacity for observa-
tion. 57  “ Women’s reason is of a practical sort which leads them to quite capa-
bly ﬁ nd the means to arrive at a known end, but does not lead them to ﬁ nd such 
an end. ” 58 All of this is dressed up in a series of virtues that compensate for 
women’s natural limitations in terms of reason, and which are associated with 
chastity, modesty, sweetness, wit, and beauty. 
 The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the public arena is the 
exclusive territory of men. 59 Women, on the other hand, were born to remain 
 53  ANA RUBIO CASTRO, FEMINISMO Y CIUDADANÍA [FEMINISM AND CITIZENSHIP] 74 (Instituto Andaluz de la 
Mujer 1997). 
 54  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 412 (Basic Books 1979) (1762). 
 55  Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, for Rousseau, natural differences among men, including differ-
ences in their physical strength, are minimal and never dictate further differences among them:  “ In-
equality is barely perceptible in the natural state, and  … its inﬂ uence thereon nearly null, ” a situation 
that should be applied to the heart of civil society.  See  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ,  Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundations of Inequality among Mankind ,  in  THE SOCIAL CONTRACT  AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES , 
 supra note 50, at 69. Thus Rousseau concludes that  “ moral inequality, merely authorized by positive 
law, goes against natural law if it does not keep proportion with physical inequality. ”  Id . at 316. 
 56  R OUSSEAU,  supra note 50. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Although our analysis has centered on the work of Rousseau, Kymlicka reminds us how liberal 
theory’s traditional division between state and society, by virtue of the patriarchal culture it has 
inherited, ends up becoming a division between the male public realm (state and society), and the 
female domestic realm (mainly the family). Women fare as badly or worse in the Aristotelian re-
publican tradition that inspires Rousseau, a tradition that sees not society but, rather, the realm of 
politics, as the environment par excellence for human freedom, sanctioning the distinction be-
tween the genders in the same way and condemning women to contribute to the sphere of depend-
ence, necessity, and daily routine within the family.  See  WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 390 – 392 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
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far away from the public sphere and to put their virtues at the service of the pri-
vate, which one understood to mean the domestic realm. The boundaries drawn 
by modernity between public and private terrain, that is, between masculine 
and feminine, are well known, and it is not our intention to harp on this matter. 
We do, however, wish to highlight two points: ﬁ rst, arguments that hold men to 
be political subjects within the modern state and that, at the same time, disqual-
ify women are not simply circumstantial. Nor is the disqualiﬁ cation of women a 
mere oversight, 60 or a temporary deﬁ ciency in the articulation of the state — a 
deﬁ ciency that, as with the exclusion of non – property owners, could eventually 
be put right with the transition to democratic statehood. It cannot be regarded 
as such without casting doubt on the very contractual basis of the state. 61 This 
is so because the logic underlying the social contract reﬂ ects the liberal view of 
the human subject as an autonomous being in deﬁ ning his own life project, a 
view that is likewise upheld by the myth of the independence of the individual, 
which is to say, the assumption that the individual is free in the sense that he 
can go about the business of life independently of others on whom he does not 
depend and who do not depend upon him. 62 Thomas Hobbes eloquently offers 
this view of the individual:  “ Let us consider men  … as if but even now sprung 
out of the earth and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without 
all kind of engagement to each other. ” 63 There is no room here for individual 
dependence or for understanding how to reconcile personal autonomy with the 
responsibility of dependency. Dependency is seen, not as a fundamental aspect 
of the person, but as an external enemy against which man, naturally free, must 
defend himself. 64 Thus conceived, independence becomes an essential attribute 
of the individual in the modern interpretation thereof, an attribute that the lib-
eral state poses as a prerequisite for access to active citizenship, and that the 
democratic state presumes in theory and aspires to in practice. 
 60  See, in a similar vein,  CELIA AMORÓS, TIEMPO DE FEMINISMO: SOBRE FEMINISMO, PROYECTO ILUSTRADO Y POSTMODER-
NIDAD [FEMINIST TIMES: ON FEMINISM, THE ENLIGHTENED PROJECT AND POSTMODERNITY] 155 – 156 (Cátedra 2000). 
 61  The words of Rousseau in  Politics and the Arts are eloquent in this sense:  “ Even if it could be de-
nied that a special sentiment of chasteness is natural in women  … it is in society’s interest that 
women should acquire these qualities. ” Penny Weiss & Anne Harper,  Rousseau and the Political 
Defence of the Sex-Roled Family, in  FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 43, 44 (Lynda 
Lange ed., Penn. State Univ. Press 2002). 
 62  See Ana Rubio Castro,  La representación política de las mujeres: Del voto a la democracia paritaria 
[ Women’s Political Representation: From the Vote to Parity Democracy ],  in  10 AÑOS DE HISTORIA 1995 –
 2005 [ 10 YEARS OF HISTORY 1995-2005] 45 – 76 (Editorial Asociación Seminario Mujer 
 Latinomericana-Mujer Andaluza 2005). 
 63  THOMAS HOBBES,  Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society ,  in  THE ENGLISH WORKS 
OF THOMAS HOBBES 109 (William Molesworth ed., Wissenschaﬂ iche Buchgesellschaft 1966),  cited in 
 SHEILA BENHABIB ,  The Generalised and the Concrete Other ,  in  SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND 
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 148, 156 (Polity Press 1992). 
 64  ROUSSEAU ,  supra note 50. 
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 The problem is that, since independence is a myth, the state can only assume 
the individual to be independent if it goes to the trouble of removing all manifes-
tations of individual dependency. It became necessary to  “ design an  ‘ I ’ that needs 
nothing from anyone,  … an  ‘ I ’ that is beholden to no one nor is anyone beholden 
to him. ” 65 Such a construct was possible to the extent that the individual was 
conceived of as male, and women were assigned the tasks associated with man’s 
dependency. Thus, what was postulated as women’s dependency on men — a 
dependency that disqualiﬁ ed them for the public realm — consisted deep down of 
their taking on the tasks arising from human dependency, both their own and 
that of others. These tasks were necessary for the survival of individuals — men 
and women alike — physically, socially, and culturally. This is the basis of the 
sexual pact inherent in the social contract. This is the pact of fraternity — frater-
nity expressed as a value in the revolutionary triad, a necessary value for the 
enactment of the other two: the liberty and equality — of men. 66 In other words, 
in the social contract men achieved the appearance of being free and equal, and 
thus independent, thanks to having shifted onto women, in a pact of fraternity, 
the weight of their own dependency. 
 The independence of men that the social contract celebrates and purports to 
perpetuate is the result, then, of the shift of their own dependency onto women, 
a structured shift that is precisely based on this social and sexual contract. In 
this double contract, women do not ﬁ gure as subjects but, rather, as outsiders 
who enable it. Women enable the existence of the public sphere, politics, and 
society without participating in it, in fact, precisely to the extent that they do 
 not participate in it. Their incorporation as citizens of the state is produced in 
this scenario through the family, where women give life to the illusion of the 
independence of men, operating as  “ the invisible support of the  ‘ I ’ , a support 
that acts on amorous sentiment. ” 67 In this way, liberal thinking ended up 
grounded on a concept of personal autonomy that is also a deﬁ nition of the 
genders. Men are the free and independent beings that, as such, can carry out 
life projects autonomously or cultivate political virtues in the public realm; 
women are the administrators of man’s dependency. 
 The acknowledgment of women’s right to suffrage created a wrinkle in the 
model just described. To grant women the status of citizens meant to also rec-
ognize their capacity to act in the public realm as rational beings, as modern 
subjects, thus breaking with the division of roles imposed by the liberal state. 
 65  RUBIO CASTRO ,  supra note 53, at 82. 
 66  PATEMAN ,  supra note 52, at 109. 
 67  RUBIO CASTRO ,  supra note 53, at 87. On the role of love, understood as romantic love, as an ele-
ment that shapes the state, see  ELENA PULCINI, AMOUR-PASSION E AMORE CONIUGALE:  ROUSSEAU E L´ORIGINE 
DE UN CONFLITTO MODERNO [PASSION-LOVE AND CONJUGAL LOVE: ROUSSEAU AND THE ORIGIN OF A MODERN CONFLICT] 
(Marsilio Editori 1990);  ANNA JÓNASDÓTTIR, EL PODER DEL AMOR: ¿LE IMPORTA EL SEXO A LA DEMOCRACIA? [THE 
POWER OF LOVE: DOES SEX MATTER TO DEMOCRACY?] (Cátedra 1993);  NIKLAS LUHMANN, LIEBE ALS PASSION:  ZUR 
CODIERUNG VON INTIMITÄT [ LOVE AS PASSION: THE CODIFICATION OF INTIMACY ] (Suhrkamp 1994). 
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Hence the signiﬁ cance of suffrage, both theoretical and symbolic. And hence 
why, although women’s suffrage did not distort the practical, everyday func-
tioning of the sexual contract, its concession would in most cases come after 
universal men’s suffrage and after a long-fought social and political struggle. 
 Despite all of this — and this is the second point we wish to emphasize —
 neither the transition to the democratic state nor the concession of women’s 
right to vote and to stand for elections has altered the premises of the sexual 
 contract. To begin with, the effects of conceding to women political rights were 
mitigated by the cultural and economic reinforcement of the premises of the sex-
ual contract in the post – World War II years. These were the years of the triumph 
of the nuclear family as the ideal family model, both in the economic domain and 
in the social imagination. These were the years that created the myth of the 
bourgeois ﬁ gure of the housewife, entrusted with caring for the home, her hus-
band, and children and spending the family salary to the beneﬁ t of all — a salary 
that was earned exclusively by her husband. 68 This model of the family dimin-
ished the potential of women’s suffrage to transform the contractual basis of the 
state. It reinforced the public realm as the territory of men, as it did the private 
sphere as the domain of women, thus solidifying the foundations for the demo-
cratic state as rooted in the premises of the liberal social and sexual contract. This 
meant an endemic majority participation of men in public affairs, employment, 
and politics throughout a public arena built on the foundations of the ideal of 
male independence. There is no room, then, for human interdependency as a 
natural, necessary, and daily feature of people’s lives. Rather, human depend-
ency becomes a pathology, something that must be removed and disregarded in 
order for people to be able to function in the public sphere according to the ideal 
of independence. In the democratic state, therefore, citizens continue to be con-
ceptualized as independent individuals, individuals who interact with one 
another as free agents, as it were, while removing all manifestations of their every -
day dependencies. 69 
 As long as it continues to be controlled by men, the public realm will con-
tinue to serve this masculine ideal of independence. As long as the state contin-
ues to rest on the ﬁ ction of independence, participation in public life is possible 
only for those who are in a position to shift their own everyday dependencies 
onto the shoulders of others. Furthermore, it is well known that women’s shift 
to the public sphere of independence has not been accompanied by a parallel 
shift of men to the private one, where human dependency is handled. Such a 
 68  For a critique of this family model, see Nancy Fraser,  After the Family Wage, in  JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: 
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POST-SOCIALIST CONDITION 41 (Routledge 1996). 
 69  In this regard, we share the position of Joan Tronto, who explains how caregiving has been left 
aside in moral and political thinking due to the contradiction, both theoretical and practical, be-
tween the predominant discourse of autonomy and equality, on the one hand, and the reality of 
human vulnerability and interdependence, on the other.  See  JOAN TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES 
( Routledge 1993). 
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shift is hard to imagine without a prior cultural reassessment of domestic work. 
This is why women’s independence still depends upon the extent to which they 
can displace their dependency on to other economically marginalized groups. 
 4.  Human interdependency and political representation 
 The foregoing is the situation parity democracy proposes to rectify. By includ-
ing an equal number of men and women in the public realm of representation, 
parity democracy provides the basis for the state to cease being the exclusive 
venue of individuals perceived as independent, and it allows for dependence —
 symbolized and managed mainly by women — to enter the public realm. The 
sexual contract had relegated human dependence to the private sphere, 
considered the natural terrain of women; moreover, the democratic state 
continues to see it as an obstacle to the ideal independence of autonomous 
people. With parity democracy, such dependence may move into the public 
realm as an equally important facet of ordinary life. Once human dependence 
ceases to be perceived as an obstacle to participation in public affairs, political 
representation can be achieved not only with regard to the masculine ideal of 
individuals but also in terms of those aspects that the sexual contract tradition-
ally ascribed to women. The state could then go on to represent all individuals 
in all their complexity; human autonomy, as aspired to under the liberal ideal, 
would be thus redeﬁ ned. The paradigm would no longer be the dependence-
free adult but, rather, the adult who takes responsibility for his or her own 
dependence as well as for those who depend upon him or her as natural limita-
tions on any life project. 
 Parity democracy is, then, in line with the dismantling of the sexual con-
tract and the implementation of a truly democratic state. A parliament com-
posed of a similar number of men and women encompasses independence and 
the management of dependence in equal measure, thus achieving the advance-
ment of an ideal of human autonomy that assumes the interdependence of 
individuals instead of denying it. That said, assuming that the goal is to break 
the sexual contract, and to do so by incorporating interdependence into the 
political realm as a deﬁ ning element thereof, we can ask ourselves: Why is it 
necessary to impose parity democracy to reach that goal? Why is it not enough 
to have a parliament composed, essentially, of men inclined to pass laws 
 providing both for people unable to function autonomously and for their 
caretakers? 
 We believe the answer is twofold. First, there is the symbolic and cultural 
aspect. The very existence of a parliament composed of an equal number of 
men and women radiates the message to all citizens that politics is no longer 
reserved for independent men nor even for a select group of women who have 
managed to adapt to the male parameters of independence. It is, instead, a set-
ting where both genders must come together to debate the common good. In 
this sense, parity democracy has the speciﬁ c potential to expand the horizons 
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of what women and girls imagine to be possible for themselves. And given that 
women’s exclusion from politics is structurally linked to the very deﬁ nition of 
masculinity and femininity (respectively, in terms of independence and the 
management of dependence), parity democracy works as an instrument of cul-
tural transformation that dismantles the pillars of the social contract standing 
on those deﬁ nitions. 
 The other aspect is functional. We believe it unlikely that a parliament com-
posed mainly of men can give the management of dependence its due place in 
the public realm — as a fundamental, deﬁ ning element of that realm and not as 
a social pathology that must be treated. Since politics has forever been domi-
nated by men who operate on rules conjured up from the myth of independ-
ence (think, for instance, about the requirement of total availability in terms of 
work schedule and geographic mobility), and since this myth has only been 
sustainable due to the existence of women who handle men’s dependency from 
the shadows, we are now faced with a political world custom-made to ﬁ t its 
own false paradigm. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political class is an 
avid consumer of care provided by others, while it undervalues the  “ female ” 
work of managing dependence. 70 This being so, there is no good reason to think 
that the political class (consisting primarily of men) would have any interest in 
questioning a system that privileges them and, at this point, is simply accepted 
by most people as the natural way of things. 
 Here it could be argued that matters are already changing, and that parity 
is not necessary to bring about change. There are already women in politics, 
and there is no reason to believe that their presence will not grow over time. 
Along with those growing numbers, it may be expected that the management 
of dependence will take on an increasingly central role in public affairs. We 
contend, however, that the dismantling of the sexual contract requires parity 
and, therefore, that it can be imposed by law if it does not occur spontaneously. 
What the uneven presence of women in politics shows is not that the public 
sphere, as currently conceived, has internalized human interdependence as a 
deﬁ ning element in the same way it has internalized the cult of independence. 
What the presence of some women in politics proves is that there are women 
who are capable of playing by the rules created by men in the same way men 
do. And they are capable of doing it by virtue of bearing a much greater cost 
than men do (the so-called double shift); or by approximating the ideal of the 
 “ unburdened ” male required by the rules of politics (which implies, for women, 
not marrying, or divorcing quickly, and not having children, or having 
fewer than desired); or because the privileges of class allow them to  signiﬁ cantly 
 70  Tronto coins the notion of “privileged irresponsibility ” to refer to the advantage enjoyed by 
groups in power as a result of other people taking care of them and the people that depend on them, 
and the notion of  “ care demanding ” to refer to the double process of depending to a great extent on 
the care of others and, at the same time, devaluating or trivializing the importance of this care.  See 
 TRONTO ,  supra note 69. 
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shift those dependencies onto the shoulders of other women. 71 Indeed, what is 
most common for women involved in politics is a combination of all these fac-
tors. Although there are women to be found in politics, ﬁ tting domestic respon-
sibilities into the demands of a life in politics continues to be the greatest 
obstacle to women who want to have such a career. 72 
 In this sense, using a quota system to impose a minimum number of women 
seems inadequate, simply because it is not enough to dismantle the social con-
tract. It is true that such a minimum broadens the bases of deliberation for the 
inclusion of interests. It is reasonable to assume that for as long as the average 
female politician continues to be more responsible for managing dependence 
than the average male politician, she will be better able, by virtue of her own 
life experience and that of others close to her, to relate to the demands of caring 
for dependents. But quotas are inadequate nonetheless in both the functional 
and symbolic sense when it comes to the ultimate goal of disestablishing the 
sexual contract. To begin with, quotas can have negative effects. There is the 
resentfulness of men, who see quotas as an undue privilege, and the resistance 
of women, who are or aspire to be in politics and do not wish this achievement 
to be viewed as the result of a quota rather than merit alone. 73 There is the 
additional risk that  “ quota women ” will feel that this status imposes on them a 
duty to defend the interests of all women. Quotas also create the risk that the 
traditional, gender-based division of tasks will be reproduced within represent-
ative bodies, a division that would ultimately consign women to the ministries, 
commissions, and committees most involved in dependence issues at the soci-
etal level (social affairs, environment, health, education), while reserving the 
supposedly hardcore issues of politics (economy, national and foreign affairs) 
 71  In this regard, it comes as no surprise that the greatest difference between male and female mem-
bers of the Spanish Parliament is not their experience, education level, or job proﬁ le but, rather, their 
marital status: there are many more single or divorced women than single or divorced men.  See Celia 
Valiente, Luis Ramiro, & Laura Morales,  Mujeres en el parlamento: un análisis de las desigualdades de 
género en el Congreso de los Diputados [ Women in Parliament: An Analysis of Gender Inequalities in the 
House of Representatives ], 121  REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS 192 – 193 (2003) . 
 72  Sociological studies on women’s underrepresentation in politics make a distinction between  supply-
related factors (referring to the fact that few women seem to opt for politics) and demand- related factors 
(by which male-imposed structures, rules, and practices in politics are alienating for women and tend 
to exclude them). The fact that both types of factors are clearly connected to assigning the manage-
ment of dependency predominantly to women is easily understood when the underlying causes of the 
lack of supply are analyzed. Among those cited as motivation factors (linked mainly to the develop-
ment of women in a patriarchal society that sets femininity and agency against each other and deﬁ nes 
femininity in terms of domestic duties) are household duties, time constraints (not only in terms of lack 
of time but also lack of predictability or ﬂ exibility of scheduling), and lack of self-conﬁ dence related to 
lack of resources (such as political experience, contact network, social status, and technical and social 
skills).  See  MACKAY ,  supra note 43, at 57 – 61. Thus, it has been argued that without a more equitable 
sharing of household chores, it will be very difﬁ cult to achieve equally effective rights for women to take 
part in public affairs.  See generally  SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 4 (Basic Books 1984). 
 73  See  MACKAY ,  supra note 43, at 72 – 73. 
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for men. 74 Ultimately, under the quota system independence continues to be 
assumed as the norm, while concessions are made to the representation of the 
management of dependence as an exception. 
 Instead, parity impacts both genders equally, putting them and the respective 
notions of independence and the management of dependency each represents on 
an equal footing in public affairs, with the result that neither dependency nor 
caretaking nor the female gender is stigmatized. Furthermore, the quota system 
does not create a base for the types of women who go into politics to become 
increasingly representative of the female gender in functional terms. Rather, 
aspiring to a minimum number probably will cause a kind of natural selection 
among women, favoring those who function most like men and are thus less rep-
resentative of the underrepresented gender. 75 Therefore, while quotas may change 
the players on the political ﬁ eld, they will not likely make any change in the rules 
of the game. 76 Parity, on the other hand, can redeﬁ ne those rules by granting 
equal relevance to both independence and the management of dependency. 
 In light of all the above, if we are right and if democracy properly conceived 
must transcend the premises of the sexual contract, then parity — the equal 
presence of both genders in politics — is a democratic must. Only by including 
women and men on equal terms in the public realm is it possible to transform 
politics from a terrain governed by the myth of human independence and to 
make room for the notion of interdependence. This will redeﬁ ne the relative 
importance and social value placed upon independence, on the one hand, and 
the management of dependency, on the other. Only then will we be able to 
reassess gender roles and move beyond the sexual contract. 77 
 5.  Final observations 
 We have argued that parity democracy is necessary for the transition to and 
realization of a truly democratic state since it will allow the state to strip away the 
 74  On how female members of Parliament have focused on health, education, and family-related 
issues, at least until well into the 1980s, see  VICKY RANDALL, WOMEN AND POLITICS (2d ed., Macmillan 
1987). In Spain, too, a noticeable difference has been found between the percentages of repre-
sentatives of both genders who belong to parliamentary commissions related to social policies.  See 
Valiente et al.,  supra note 71, at 193 – 194. 
 75  See  MACKAY ,  supra note 43, at 72 – 73. 
 76  Similarly, on equal work opportunities for women, Cynthia Cockburn has referred to the exist-
ence of a short and a long agenda. The short agenda aims to attain equal opportunity by assimilat-
ing women into the status quo, whereas the long one seeks to transform the system (society, jobs, 
politics) to reﬂ ect the functional difference between genders.  See Cynthia Cockburn,  Equal Opportu-
nities: The Short and Long Agenda , 20  INDUST. REL. J. 218 (1989). 
 77  In this regard, it has been pointed out that parity allows for not only caregiving women but also 
caregiving men, that is, for inclusion of masculine types that have also traditionally been excluded 
from the political sphere and, in this sense, extends the range of culturally acceptable masculini-
ties.  See  MACKAY ,  supra note 43, at 209. 
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false paradigm of independence that currently guides participation in politics. 
Parity democracy would clear the way for those who, by virtue of the socio sexual 
contract, exemplify and embody the managing of dependency, enabling them to 
take their place on equal terms alongside those who typify independence. The 
realm of public representation would then truly belong to all, both male and 
female, which, as has been said,  “ [would entail] a transformation of the initial 
concept on which representation is based and, in turn, of sovereignty. ” 78 And 
not so much because the population is composed of men and women, but because 
one represents independence while the other represents the managing of depend-
ency. Parity, then, is about bringing into politics the reality that everyone’s inde-
pendence depends upon the proper management of our nature as dependent 
beings upon whom, in turn, others depend. The only vision of independence that 
can be a truly faithful representation of ourselves as human beings is one that 
incorporates our dependencies as well. Parity democracy aims to integrate the 
human dimensions of independence and dependence in the public realm. This 
will free us from the structuring of society based on the liberal disassociation 
between the ideal of independence/public realm, on the one hand, and depend-
ency/private realm, on the other, and from the respective gender roles associated 
with each. It is about making room for both ends of this false dichotomy in state 
representative institutions and about ﬁ nally building an all- embracing state 
with the equal inclusion of all individuals in all their dimensions. 
 Given that women’s exclusion from politics has been key to the cultural deﬁ -
nition of the genders, the project of building this all-embracing state must begin 
in the political arena through parity democracy. The dismantling of the sexual 
contract must begin at its foundations, in the deﬁ nition of what is public. 
However, this project cannot rest at just that; it must extend to all centers of 
power within society — not only in politics but at the economic, social, and cul-
tural levels as well. It must also penetrate family walls. In this sense, it is worth 
celebrating that the Spanish Law on Real Equality of Women and Men, in addi-
tion to instating electoral parity, has put into place measures that promote 
equal participation by women and men in corporate decision making, as well as 
other measures to facilitate both the reconciliation of work, personal, and fam-
ily lives and the joint responsibility for domestic tasks and family caretaking. All 
of this is relevant to the ultimate implications of electoral parity. Advocating 
parity is part of the larger goal of disassembling culturally entrenched gender 
roles, a dismantling that must occur in both the public and private realms, most 
notably in domestic life. Electoral parity puts men and women in the position of 
being the driving force behind this broader purpose, without which true equal-
ity between men and women will prove unattainable. 
 78  Encarna Bodelón González,  La soberanía popular y el sujeto femenino: Los límites del concepto de so-
beranía desde una crítica feminista [ Public Sovereignty and the Female Subject: The Limits of the Concept 
of Sovereignty from a Critical Feminist Perspective ],  in  SOBERANÍA: UN PRINCIPIO QUE SE DERRUMBA [SOVER-
EIGNTY: A CRUMBLING PRINCIPLE] 141 (Roberto Bergally & Eligio Resta eds., Paidós 1996). 
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 79  Thus, care theorists have supported the idea that women, due to their traditional caregiving 
roles, operate according to different rules, values, and virtues than men do. For example, it has 
been said that women tend to reason more in terms of conﬂ icting responsibilities than in terms of 
rights, contextualize more than men when solving problems, and are more concerned about tak-
ing on responsibilities and sustaining relationships than about formality and afﬁ rmation of ab-
stract rules.  See  CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1982). 
 80  See, e.g .,  MACKAY,  supra note 43, at 89 – 90, 108, as well as other sources cited therein. 
 There has been much discussion as to whether women’s ethics are different 
from men’s; whether women’s ethics are affected by their experience as care-
givers and administrators of human relations; and whether these factors 
would naturally lead women to a type of politics different from men’s. 79 If this 
were true, ﬂ ooding representative bodies with women would create new oper-
ating rules that would make politics more compatible with caring for depend-
ents. Questions such as the following would move to the forefront: Who takes 
care of the children and parents of members of parliament? What about travel, 
illness? What time do daycare facilities close? When are school vacations? It 
would also guarantee the inclusion of human-dependence – related issues as 
core interests on the political agenda, rescuing them from their current politi-
cal and cultural devaluation. Beyond all this, if care theorists are right, what 
would change would be the very way we do politics. It has been said, for exam-
ple, that from a highly competitive, aggressive, hierarchical model full of for-
malisms, we could advance toward one that is more deliberative, empathetic, 
and cooperative. This new model would be deﬁ ned more by the search for com-
promise and mutual responses to shared needs than by the prevalence of par-
ticular interests. It would be more about cooperation among individuals who 
are aware of their interdependence, and less about competition among indi-
viduals who see themselves as independent. 80 All of this would make the realm 
of politics slightly more habitable for many women and for some men, too. 
 It is impossible to know what the world would be like if women had contrib-
uted equally to governing it for centuries. What does seem reasonable to assume 
is that the world of politics made in the image and semblance of women would 
be different from the one made, thus far, in the image of men; policies and ways 
of operating based on an awareness of human interdependence would have 
their rightful place in a world that, until now, has operated on the notion of 
independence. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that women’s equal partici-
pation alongside men in the world of politics would challenge the parameters of 
what has been considered standard in this traditionally male world.  
 Postscript:  While this article was in proofs, the Spanish Constitutional Court issued 
a decision (STC 12/2008, January 29 2008), holding that parity provisions do not 
violate the Spanish Constitution. 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/6/2/287/737053
by UNIVERSIDAD DE SEVILLA user
on 08 June 2018
